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Civil No. 7783

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION and GEORGE INGALLS,
dba George's Market,
Plailntiffs in Intervention
amd Respondents,
-vs.-

JAMES L. BUSH, dba Bush Super
Market,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT JAMES L. BUSH
djbja BUSH SUPER MARKET
Appeal From the District Court of the Second Judicial
District in and for the County of Weber
Honorable Parley E. N orseth, Judge .
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
~RADE

COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION and GEORGE INGALLS,
dba George's Market,
Plaintiffs in Intervention
and Respondents,
-vs.-

Civil No. 7783

JAMES L. BUSH, dba Bush Super
Market,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT JAMES L. BUSH
d/b/a BUSH SUPER MARKET

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The declared purpose of this action was to enjoin
defendant from selling groceries below cost with the intent or effect of injuring competitors and destroying
competition in violation of the Unfair Practices Act
(R. 1). The undeclared but only basis for the complaint was that defendant issued S. & H. cash discount
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stamps to customers who paid cash for certain staple
items of groceries sold at the minimum markup required
by the Act (R. 21 and 15).
Defendant denied that he sold any groceries below
cost or that he issued the stamps with the intent to
injure his competitors or destroy competition. He also
challenged the constitutionality of the Unfair Practices
Act (R. 11).
The trial took place on August 27 and 28, 1951, in
the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, before the Honorable Parley E. N orseth, who handed down
a memorandum decision, dated October 29, 1951, to the
effect that defendant had violated the Act, as charged,
and that the Act, although lacking in definiteness, was
not so indefinite as to be "wholly unconstitutional" (R.
15). In due course, findings of fact and conclusions of
law were stated (R. 20), an appropriate decree was
entered (R. 24), and this appeal was filed (R. 27).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For more than fifty years, The Sperry and Hutchinson Company has made available to retail merchants
throughout the United States a system which enables
them to allow the equivalent of a cash discount on small
as well as large purchases (R. 173-174). There is no
coin small enough to provide for discounts on purchases
under 50¢. The equivalent can be accomplished, however, through the use of stamps which serve as tokens.
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Under the S. & H. contract, retail merchants are licensed
to make use of the S. & H. Co-operative Cash Discount
System by issuing S. & H. Co-operative Discount Stamps
to customers who pay in cash or, in any event, on or before the 15th proximo. The purpose stated in the contract is to make available to the merchant ''a Co-operative Cash Discount System whereby there may be offered
to retail customers a cash discount on all cash payments,
irrespective of their amount, thereby inviting and rewarding cash or prompt payment for goods sold, decreasing the merchant's losses from slow or bad accounts and
attracting and greatly increasing the volume of his cash
trade" (Pltfs'. Ex. "A").
As the system operates, the licensee issues to the
customer one stamp, as a token or symbol of a discount,
for each ten cents paid in cash. These stamps are supplied by The Sperry and Hutchinson Company and are
pasted in books provided for that purpose by The Sperry
and Hutchinson Company. Both the stamps and the
books remain the property of the Company (Deft's. Ex.
2). When the customer has accumulated 1200 of the
stamps, or sooner at the customer's request, the Company redeems them either in merchandise or cash (R.
175-176).
To provide the stamps the retail merchant pays The
Sperry and Hutchinson Company $15 a pad ( Pltfs '. Ex.
"A"). They represent for the customer a discount of
2.08% if redeemed in merchandise, or 1.66% if redeemed
in cash (R. 176).
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This system has been popularized in thirty-nine
states (R. 174); and has been licensed in Utah since
1914 (R. 179). At the time of the trial there were some
30,000 licensees in the United States, of which 197 were
in Utah and 11,397 in the eight western states of Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon
and Washington (R. 180).
The advantages which a retail merchant derives
from operating on a cash basis are obvious:
(a) He is spared the expense of extending credit to
his customers: his capital is not tied up, neither does
he have to pay interest on borrowed capital (R. 142-143;
187);
(b) He can save money on his own purchases by
paying cash to his suppliers and enjoying the consequent
discounts (R. 143) ;
(c) He avoids losses on bad debts (R. 143; 187);
.(d) He minimizes his bookkeeping expense and thus
reduces his overhead (R. 187; 190);
(e) He cuts his delivery cost because cash customers
carry their own purchases ( R. 190) ;
(f) Last but not least, of course, he attracts customers who are willing to trade on a cash and carry basis
in order to realize the consequent savings.
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It does not follow, however, that because there are
advantages to the merchant in operating on a cash basis,
he is getting something for nothing: the discount that
he allows is the cost to him of the advantage which he
enjoys. Similarly, it cannot be said that the customer
who receives the discount gets something for nothing:
the loss of the use of his money sooner than would otherwise be the case is the cost to him. In other words, a
cash discount represents a quid pro quo; it is something
for something, not something for nothing.

In January 1947, Mr. Bush opened a cash and carry
super market at 26th Street and Quincy Avenue in Ogden,
Utah, where, in November 1950, he installed the S. & H.
Co-operative Cash Discount System (R. 42). Thereafter he issued to his customers one S. & H. cash discount stamp for every ten cents paid in cash for anything or everything in his store ( R. 42 ; 48 ; 53). The
cost of providing these stamps, Mr. Bush treated as a
non:-operating expense. The daily and monthly sales
were recorded in his books at the prices actually paid by
his customers (R. 143), and the stamps were included
with other non-operating expenses which were subsequently deducted from gross sales in order to arrive
at net profit (R. 197). This was a proper and appropriate
method from an accounting point of view (R. 203). Pending their use, the stamps were carried in a deferred
account, for control purposes, in the same fashion that
prepaid insurance is customarily carried (R. 197; 200).
This, too, was perfectly proper (R. 203).
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Not only did Mr. Bush recognize the advantages of
operating his business on a cash basis (R. 142-143) but
he considered the stamps as an advertising medium (R.
51; 53; 159), a trade stimulant (R. 56; 140). His purpose in using them was to attract additional business, not
from any particular competitor but, generally, from anywhere he could get it (R. 53; 224), and, in his opinion,
they did attract business to his store (R. 55; 223).
In 1937, ten years before Mr. Bush went into the
grocery business but many years after the S. & H. cash
discount system had become established in Utah, the
legislature of this state enacted an Unfair Practices Act
(Title 16A, Chapter 4) to prohibit the sale of merchandise at less than ''cost'' (as defined in the statute)
with the intent or effect of injuring competitors and
destroying competition. In lieu of actual cost, however,
the statute permitted the retail merchant, if he wished,
to take his invoice and freight, add to it an arbitrary
markup of 6% for overhead, and thus arrive at what we
shall refer to as ''statutory cost''. At the time when
Mr. Bush became a licensee of The Sperry & Hutchinson
Company, in November 1950, the practice had become
established in the retail grocery business in Ogden of
selling certain staple items, such as soap, coffee, flour,
canned milk and other volume items (R. 84), at the fixed
minimum markup of 6% (R. 47). About thirty-five per
cent of the so-called "dry line" of groceries were 6%
items (R. 131-132). In Mr. Bush's case, which was
probably typical, something like twenty-five per cent of
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the volume of sales were 6o/o items (R. 47; 57; 84) and,
since his cash discount was storewide, ~1:r. Bush issued
S. & H. cash discount stamps with these items, just as
he did with all the rest (R. 53). 95% of the 6% items
originated outside of the State of Utah (R. 132).
Upon the theory that the effect of the stamps was
to reduce the price of the 6o/o items below cost, the Trade
Commission of Utah ordered Mr. Bush to cease and
desist issuing stamps with such items (R. 1), and, when
he refused, instituted the present action to compel him
to desist.
For an understanding of the nature of the controversy, these, we believe, are all the facts that are
required. There are others to which we shall presently
refer in the belief that they may prove helpful in resolving the issues, and still others which, we think,
merely color and becloud the issues.
THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT
The Unfair Practices Act (Title 16A, Chapter 4,
Utah Code Annotated 1943) was enacted in 1937 and
provides, in part, as follows :
"16A-4-7. Sales, less than cost.-(a) It shall
be unlawful for any person * * * to sell * * *
any article * * * at less than the cost thereof
to such vendor * * * for the purpose of injuring
competitors and destroying competition * * * or
when the effect of selling * * * at less than cost
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"" • * may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce ; and he * * * shall also be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be subject to the penalties [fine or imprisonment, or
both] set out in section 15 of this act for any
such act.''

"Cost defined: * * * 3. When used in this
act, the term 'cost to the retailer' shall mean the
invoice cost of the merchandise to the retailer
within thirty days prior to the date of sale, or the
date of offering for sale, or the replacement cost
of the merchandise to the retailer, whichever is
lower; less all trade discounts except customary
discounts for cash; to which shall be added: (a)
freight charges [if incurred] * * *, and (b) cartage [if incurred] * **,and (c) a markup to cover
a proportionate part of the cost of doing business,
which markup, in the absence of proof of a lesser
cost, shall be six per cent of the cost to the retailer as herein set forth after adding thereto
freight charges and cartage * * * ''
* * *

*

"16A-4-9. Transactions involving more than
one item.-For the purpose of preventing evasion
of the provisions of this act in all sales involving
more than one item or commodity and in all sales
involving the giving of any concession of any kind
whatsoever (whether it be coupons or otherwise)
the vendor's or distributor's selling price shall
not be below the cost of all articles, products, commodities and concessions included in such transactions.''
* • "" *
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'' 16A-4-12. Sales exempt from act.-The provisions of this act shall not apply to any sales
made:
(a) In closing out * • • stock • * *;
(b) \Yhen the goods are damaged • • • ;
(c) By an officer • • • of any court ;
(d) In an endeavor made in good faith to meet
the legal prices of a competitor as herein
defined selling the same article, product or
commodity in the same locality or trade
area. • • •. ''

• • • •
"16A-4-17. Policy of Act.-The legislature
declared that the purpose of this act is to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage
competition, by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition
is destroyed or prevented. This act shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be
sub served.''
STATEMENT OF POINTS
!-Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie
case because they did not prove that defendant sold
any merchandise below cost, whether actual or statutory, but only that defendant sold merchandise at
statutory cost. We say this because the merchandise
was marked up six per cent as required by the Act,
and

POINT

(a) The stamps, being an element of costs, would
have to be included in any computation of a
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markup to cover actual costs and should, for that
reason, be covered by the statutory markup of
six per cent which the statute permits in lieu
of actual costs ;
(b) The cost of providing stamps should be treated
in the case of the cash and carry merchant as
the cost of providing credit is treated in the
case of the credit and delivery merchant: if the
statutory markup of six per cent covers the
one, it should cover the other; the markup is
not selective ; and was not intended to be applied in a dis crimina tory manner;
(c) The Act specifically provides (16A-4-9) that the
retailer's cost shall be calculated on the basis of
the total purchase, not on the basis of each item
in the purchase;
(d) The sale of six per cent items alone is such a
rare event that if it should violate the statute
to issue stamps on such an occasion, the law
would not be concerned with such a trifle (de
minimis non curat lex);
POINT IT-Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie
case because cash discounts, as distinguished from
trade discounts, do not reduce prices.
PoiNT III-Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie
case because they did not prove that defendant made
any sales ''for the purpose of injuring competitors
and destroying competition.'' We say this because,
(a) Defendant's intent was only to attract cash business generally; to meet competition, not to injure his competitors and destroy competition;
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(b) Defendant cannot be held to have intended to
incite price cuts or a price war, nor can he be
held responsible for the acts of his competitors,
legal or illegal ; and
(c) Plaintiffs failed to carry the burden of proving
that defendant issued S. & H. cash discount
stamps for the purpose of injuring his competitors and destroying competition.
PoiNT IY-The Unfair Practices Act is unconstitutional
because it violates the equal protective and due
process clauses of the Federal Constitution and the
corresponding sections (Article I, sees. 1 & 7) of
the State Constitution.
(a) The Act, if construed to cover all of the costs
of the credit and delivery merchant but only
some of the costs of the cash and carry merchant, is unconstitutional.
(b) If a cash discount is an element of price rather
than cost, the Act is unconstitutional because it
makes no allowance for the difference in the
overhead of the cash and carry merchant as
compared with the overhead of the credit and
delivery merchant.
(c) The Act, if construed only to prohibit the use
of S. '& H. cash discount stamps is unconstitutional because it discriminates against a legitimate business.
(d) The Act, if construed to permit conviction upon
proof, in the alternative, of a wrongful intent or
a harmful effect, is unconstitutional.
(e) The Act is unconstitutional in any event because
it is so vague and indefinite that the retail merSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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chant is unable to ascertain when he is violating
the law and, consequently, exposing himself to
conviction of a misdemeanor and running the
risk of a fine, imprisonment, and liability for
civil damages.
POINT V-The Retail Grocers Association which is the
real party-plaintiff in this action has been guilty of
price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act and,
accordingly, comes to Court with unclean hands, and
for that reason should be denied injunctive relief,
for the Unfair Practices Act does not, and could not,
authorize price fixing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I -PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE OUT A
PRIMA FACIE CASE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT
PROVE THAT DEFENDANT SOLD ANY MERCHANDISE BELOW COST, WHETHER ACTUAL
OR STATUTORY, BUT ONLY THAT DEFENDANT
SOLD MERCHANDISE AT STATUTORY COST.

Plaintiffs rest their case on the fact, to which defendant stipulated, that Mr. Bush issued S. & H. cash
discount stamps with merchandise sold at statutory cost
(invoice or replacement cost, plus freight, plus cartage,
plus six per cent). There was no charge and no evidence
that he allowed any special discounts on these or any
other items, for the fact is that he allowed the same discount on everything in his store that was purchased for
cash. Neither was there any charge that these items
were "loss leaders". No attempt was made to show that
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Mr. Bush received less than it cost him to acquire and
handle the articles in question.
The sole question for decision is whether it was legal
for Mr. Bush to issue S. & H. cash discount stamps with
merchandise marked up six per cent. The Trade Commission contended and the Lower Court found that it
was not legal (R. 21); we respectfully submit that it was
perfectly legal.
We shall consider this question first from the point
of view of cost, for the emphasis in section 16A-4-7 with
which we are concerned in this case is on C'Ost, rather
than price: the charge is that Mr. Bush sold below cost,
not that he cut prices. Like the California Unfair Practices Act, upon which it is modeled, the Utah Unfair
Practices Act is not a price fixing statute. Food and
Grocery Bureau v. United States, 139 F. 2d 937 (C. C. A.
9th 1943). However, we shall also consider the question
from the point of view of price, for that is the way
the Commission seems to look at the case.
In all that follows, we ask the Court to bear in mind
that the statute is not only restrictive in a field which
had been traditionally free, but that it carries criminal
sanctions in the event of violation. Accordingly, unless
the statute clearly indicates that certain conduct is illegal,
it is manifest that no Court should incline tow;ards finding it so as a matter of statutory construction. See:
United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592;
19 Ann. Cas. 68.
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We also ask the Court to bear in mind that, ''to give
a discount for cash payments is a long established mercantile practice. The manufacturer allows such discount
to the jobber and wholesaler, and the jobber and wholesaler, to the retailer. To pass this on to the customer
of the retailer is but providing a benefit to him who, in
the last analysis, pays all the bills." (The Sperry and
Hutchinson Company v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 465, 226
P. 2d 501, 504 (1951) ). Under the Lower Court's interpretation, the retailer can receive but he cannot allow
cash discounts on 6% items and thus the ultimate consumer "who, in the last analysis, pays all the bills" is
deprived of a benefit which is available to everyone else
in the chain of commerce. So far as we can see, this was
never the intention of the Act and there is no legislative
sanction for such an unfair and discriminatory result.
The average family lives on a fixed or fairly fixed
income. The housewife knows within predictable limits
the amount of money available to her to purchase the
family necessities: such things as clothing, drugs, food,
and the many other items of every day consumption.
Through the use of S. & H. stamps, it is possible to
provide a discount on all of these things for the benefit
of the careful housewife who makes her purchases in
cash. If such cash discount stamps are now to be
outlawed, this avenue of thrift will be closed to her.
With these thoughts in mind, let us now consider
whether the plaintiffs made out a prima facie case to
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support their charge that defendant sold merchandise
below cost in violation of the Act.
(a) The stamps, being an element of costs, would

have to be included in any computation of a
markup to cover actual costs and should, for that
reason, be covered by the statutory markup of
six per cent which the statute permits in lieu
of act~tal costs.
It is quite undeniable that the stamps were an element of Mr. Bush's cost of doing business. He considered them in the nature of advertising and his books
showed that they were recorded as a financial expense
(R.143-14±; 197). According to one of our most prominent certified public accountants, Mr. Lincoln G. Kelley,
this was an appropriate and customary way to record
them (R. 189).
Under the Act, Mr. Bush had a choice: he could sell
his merchandise at actual cost or at statutory cost. His
choice was free. It made no difference whether the
actual cost was higher or lower than the statutory cost.
He could take either one but he could not go below the
lower of the two. The actual markup and the statutory
markup were intended for the same purpose: to cover
his cost of acquisition and ''a proportional part of the
cost of doing business''.
Now, it is apparent that, if Mr. Bush had elected
to proceed on the basis of actual cost, he would have
been compelled to count the S. & H. stamps as part of
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his cost of doing business because, in fact, The Sperry
and Hutchinson Company did not let him have them for
nothing. That being so, it is equally apparent that if,
instead, he elected to avail himself of the statutory markup of 6%, the cost of supplying the S. & H. stamps would
be covered by that markup, for that is exactly what the
Act provides. It requires the merchant to add to his
costs of acquisition ''a markup to cover a proportionate
part of the cost of doing business.'' Stamps were a part
of defendant's cost of doing business, and were therefore
covered by the markup. The markup ''in the absence of
proof of a lesser cost, shall be six percent". Mr. Bush
marked up the items six percent and thereby satisfied
the statutory requirements.
Just as Mr. Bush would have had no right to exclude
the stamps in computing his actual costs, the Commission
had no authority, no logical reason, to exclude them from
his statutory costs.
To find that Mr. Bush did not meet the statutory
requirements, one must read something into the Act which
plainly is not there and was never intended to be there :
viz., that the statutory markup is selective, that it covers
everything but the stamps. Not only will one search the
statute in vain for any inference or intimation which
would justify such a course but it is apparent that such
a course would do violence to the statute. The statutory
scheme is to take either the actual cost of doing business
or to pay no attention to actual cost and adopt an arbi-
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trary six percent in its place. The six percent bears no
particular relationship to the actual cost of operating a
retail grocery business nor to the cost of selling any
particular items in that business (R. 195), nor, for
that matter, to the cost of operating any other kind of
retail business. Gasoline and groceries, for example,
cannot be handled for the same cost. The statutory
markup is not intended to be and in the nature of things
could not possibly be anything but arbitrary. It is a
legislative standard minimum, a blanket for all costs over
and above invoice, freight and cartage. It is like the
standard exemption that the taxpayer can elect to use
instead of listing his actual deductions in the computation
of his federal income tax. The statutory six percent, like
the standard exemption, willy-nilly, covers everything,
for that is the function it is intended to fulfill. To read
into the statute an exception which would require the
retail merchant to add the cost of his stamps to the six
percent would be like requiring the taxpayer who makes
use of the standard exemption to add to his taxable income the amount that he contributes to the American Red
Cross. It would combine with the arbitrary alternative,
permitted by the act, one of the elements of the precise
method of computing costs, and thus commingle and confuse the two systems which are supposed to be quite
separate and distinct.
For the reason that the stamps would have to be
included in any computation of actual costs, we respectfully submit that they were necessarily included in the
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statutory costs and covered by the statutory markup on
the items complained of. This, alone, we believe is a
complete answer to the complaint.
(b) The cost of providing stamps should be treated

in the case of the cash and carry merc1hant as the
cost. of providing credit is treated in the case of
the credit and delivery merchant; if the statutory markup of six percent covers the one it
should cover the other; the markup is not selective, and was not intended t.o be applied itn .a
discriminatory manner.
The thought to which we now turn follows so closely
upon the thought which we have just expressed that the
Court has no doubt anticipated it and there is no need
to labor the matter. The only difficulty is to find a way
to state it without repetition.
In an effort to attract business, not at the expense
of any particular competitor but generally and with time
honored indifference to the effect that it may have upon
all of his competitors, a merchant may decide to extend
credit and make deliveries. This, he has reason to believe, will attract the trade of people who are not so
dollar conscious that they feel obliged to go to market
early to avoid the crowd or to go at a more convenient
hour and battle the crowd for the sake of a small
savings. It will attract people who feel that they can
afford the luxury of telephoning their orders and having
the groceries delivered even though they have to pay a
little more for them.
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Now the fact is that it is not for the groceries that
they pay more. Groceries are pretty standardized today
both in price and in quality. It is for the extra service,
the credit and the delivery, that the customer pays. That
extra service costs the merchant money; he cannot give
it for nothing. This is easily appreciated when one
realizes that,
(a) To extend credit, he must either pay interest on
borrowed working capital, or, which is the same
thing, lose the use of his own capital;
(b) To extend credit, he must employ additional
bookkeeping and clerical help, and incur postage
and collection charges ;
(c) By extending credit, he inevitably sustains
losses on uncollectable accounts.
All of these costs are covered by the statutory markup. On that subject there can be no doubt and there is
no dispute.
On the other hand, a merchant like Mr. Bush, in an
effort to attract business generally, may decide to allow
a discount on all cash purchases. This, he believes, will
attract the trade of people who are either willing or
obliged to put up with some inconvenience to save a
dollar. It will appeal, he thinks, to the thrifty as well
as the needy. So confident is he that this is a good way
to operate that he may decide to conduct all of his busi-
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ness on a cash and carry basis and to allow a storewide
discount on all cash purchases. That is what Mr. Bush
did.
But this cash and carry merchant, too, has to pay
something for the extra attraction. He has to pay the
Sperry and Hutchinson Company to supply the stamps
which enable him to make the discount available to his
customers.
Still a third merchant may combine the two types
of business, operating partly, or even predominantly, for
cash, and partly on credit.
Now, each one of these merchants is in competition
with the other and, when any one of them marks an
item of staple merchandise down to the statutory minimum of six percent, they all follow suit (R. 223) without
regard to whether their operations are conducted on a
cash basis, a credit basis, or both. In this way it has
come about that a substantial part (R. 84) of the retail
grocer's volume is in six percent merchandise.
Can it be, we ask, that the statutory markup was
intended to cover all of the costs of the credit and
delivery merchant in this highly competitive segment of
his business but only some of the costs of the cash and
carry merchant? Can it be that the legislature intended
to permit the credit and delivery merchant to sell staple
items at 6% and require the cash and carry merchant to
sell them at not less than 9o/o ?
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If it did intend any such arbitrary and discriminatory distinction, we doubt that any Court would hesitate
to declare the statute unconstitutional. We prefer to
think, however, that no such intention can be found in the
Act; that the legislature intended the statutory markup
to cover all the costs of a cash and carry merchant like
~Ir. Bush, just as it intended it to cover all the costs of
the credit and delivery merchants who compete with him.
The discrimination, we believe, lies in the attempted enforcement, not in the statute itself. Where a Florida
Board, in the administration of an unfair practices act
was guilty of such discrimination the Court said,
''There is a distinct difference between delivery and the cash and carry aspect of the laundry
and dry cleaning business. The manner and cost
of administration in each is materially different
and those who prefer to patronize the cash and
carry business are entitled to the advantage of
this difference. In fixing a schedule of prices, it
is the duty of the Board in the interest of the
public to take into consideration these elements
and establish a differential in charges between the
two methods accordingly. If they fail in this, they
may be required by the law as here quoted, to
do so" (188 So. 380, 382).

(Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board
v. Everglades La.undry•, 137 Fla. 290, 188
So. 380 [1939]).
See also: Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80 A. 2d 267
(Md. 1951).
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The argument that we now make may also be applied
to other items of overhead such as the cost of advertising
or the cost of providing free parking or delivery service.
If one merchant attracts his customers through advertisements or by providing free parking facilities and if
the cost of these activities is covered by the statutory
markup, why should not another merchant attract customers through the use of S. & H. cash discount stamps,
and, if he does, why should not the cost of the stamps
be covered by the statutory markup~ The comparison
is a little less apparent than the comparison of the cost
of providing a cash discount on the one hand, and borrowing capital to extend credit, on the other, but it is still
a valid comparison, and the statutory markup is just as
applicable. There is nothing selective about the statutory markup. If the cost is real, and not feigned, the
markup covers it.
This argument finds strong support in BristolMeyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A. 2d 843
(1939), where the court, holding that trading stamps did
not have the effect of cutting fair trade prices, said,
'' . . . If, for example, merchant A provides
orchestral music for his customers at a certain
hour of the day, or maintains in his store a salon
where works of art are exhibited, or a nursery
where children are fed and otherwise cared for
while their mothers are shopping in the store, or
if he provides his customers free bus service to and
from his store, merchant B has no grounds for
complaint which the law will heed. Yet all these
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things confer benefits on the customer and some
of these benefits are susceptible of pecuniary measurement. It follows, therefore, that for a merchant
to confer pecuniary benefits upon his customers,
which benefits son1e con1peting merchant does not
confer, does not amount to such unfair competition
as the Fair Trade Act forbids. Merchant A can
extend his customers 30 or 60 days credit on the
purchase of a comn1odity while merchant B refuses
to extend any credit on the purchase of the same
article. A is not thereby violating the Fair Trade
Act. A may allow a discount of 1% on all bills
paid within ten days after being rendered. B may
allow no such discount. A is not thereby violating
the Fair Trade Act'' ( 6 A. 2d 843, 847).
See also lVeco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug
Stores (Garfield), 55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 P. 2d 856
(1943).
Since the statutory markup unquestionably covers
all of the costs of the credit and delivery merchant, we
respectfully submit that it should cover all of the costs
of the cash and carry merchant, including the cost of his
cash discount stamps. This, we believe, furnishes a second, complete answer to the complaint.
(c) The .Act specifically provides that the retailer's
cost shall be calculated on the basis of the total
purchase, not on the basis of each item in the
purchase.

Knowing just what was required as evidence to support the Trade Commission's complaint, assuming the
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validity of its interpretation of the Act, Mr. Hale, the
Executive Secretary of the Commission, went into Mr.
Bush's store and bought nothing but 6% items. Such a
purchase, in normal course, would be very rare (R. 221222), perhaps no more frequent than one in a thousand
(R. 141-142). It may therefore be appropriate to consider what the rule should be when the purchase follows
the normal pattern and consists of mixed items: 6% and
others marked up perhaps as high as 30% (R. 153), the
average being at least 13% (R. 158; 195).
The Commission did not, we think, intend to conduct
a meaningless test of the legality of Mr. Bush's sales
policy, a test which would apply only to one purchase in
a thousand. On the contrary, we believe that the Commission interpreted the Act to require Mr. Bush to refrain from issuing stamps with 6% merchandise even
though the merchandise was commingled with other merchandise which brought the average markup above 6%,
and intended to test that interpretation by this action.
It intended to enforce a fiat prohibition on the issuance
of cash discount stamps with 6% items. It interpreted
the Act to require a minimum markup of 9% on each
item sold with stamps. Unless we are correct in this, the
present litigation is much ado about nothing, for, as we
have shown, it is a rare sale that relates to 6% items
alone, and the average markup in the retail grocery business is at least 13% (R. 158; 195).
If we correctly comprehend the Commission's position, we beg leave, again, to differ with it. Even assum-
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ing, arguendo, that the stamps must be offset by some
reciprocal markup, we find nothing in the Act to require
an allocation of that markup to each individual item, as
distinguished from the average markup of the purchase
as a whole. Quite to the contrary, section 16A-4-9, which
relates to "Transactions i'YI!Volving mor,e tharn one item,"
clearly provides that, if stamps are considered to be some
sort of concession, as the Commission contends, the
average rather than the individual markup should control. In very express language, this section of the Act
provides that,
''in all sales involving more than one item or commodity and in all sales involving the giving of
any concession of any kind whatsoever (whether
it be coupons or otherwise) the vendor's or distributor's selling price shall not be below the cost
of all articles, products, commodities and concessions included in such transactions." (Emphasis
ours.)
We find difficulty in paraphrasing the statute to
make it any more readily understood. If stamps are a
concession, as the Commission contends, and if the average markup in the retail grocery business is at least 13%,
there is more than enough leeway in the markup to cover
the cost of the alleged concession: the statutory cost of
the items being only 6%, there is 7% left over to meet the
cost of the alleged concession.
In State of Wisconsin v. Tanker ,Gas, Inc., 250 Wis.
218, 26 N.W. 2d 647, 649 (1947), the State of Wisconsin
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brought proceedings against a gasoline dealer who advertised that two gallons of gasoline would be given away
free (except for sales tax) with each seven gallons of
gasoline purchased. There, as here, the statute forbade
sales below cost and there, as we believe here, the State
took the position that the cost of each item had to be
separately considered. Per contra, the defendant claimed
that the nine gallons should be treated as a whole for
cost purposes, just as we contend that the full market
basket should be treated as a whole. The Court sustained defendant's position, stating:
"The legislature sought by the Unfair Sales
Act to prevent transactions in which, considered
as a whole, there was a sale of goods at less than
cost for the purposes of attracting business.''
(Emphasis ours.)
We admit that the point we have just made goes
beyond the record of the present case, for Mr. Hale
restricted his purchases to 6% items and refrained from
making the only kind of purchase (one of mixed items)
that would have provided the basis for a really meaningful test of the law but we have not restricted our
argument lest this whole proceeding boil down to nothing.
If, as we believe, it is the Commission's view that
the ''cost'' of each item in a purchase must be separately
computed when stamps are included, we respectfully
submit that we have demonstrated the contrary. At
the very least, if each item is marked up the statutory
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minimum of six percent, and the average markup in the
retail grocery business is 13%, Chapter 16A-4-9 indicates that it is no crime to include cash discount stamps
having a redemption value in merchandise of 2.08%.
This, of course, would validate all but one out of a thousand sales in Mr. Bush's store.
(d) The sale of 6o/o items alone is such a rare event

that, if it should violate the statute to issue
stamps on such an occasion, the law would not
be concerned with such a trifle (de minimis non
curat lex).
If the ''cost of all articles, products, commodities and
concessions", as the Act clearly provides, is the criterion
by which the legality of Mr. Bush's sales is to be judged,
rather than the cost of each individual component, it will
only be a very rare sale, perhaps one in a thousand,
when the Act would be violated by the issuance of stamps
even if the Court were to adopt the theory, which seems
so completely untenable to us, that the statutory markup
does not include the cost of providing stamps.
The law does not concern itself with such trifles (de
minimis non curat lex), and rightly so, for, on the one
hand, it is a practical impossibility from a management
point of view to train checkers to control such a situation
(R. 154), and, on the other hand, such a very occasional
and minor infraction of a statute which is aimed at
practices deemed to have a deleterious effect upon the
economic welfare of the community cannot have been
within the contemplation of the legislature.
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The maxim of de minimis non curat lex was applied
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Bristol-Meyers
v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A. 2d 843 (1939), when it held
that the issuance of trading stamps worth 1.76% with
each purchase did not cut prices in violation of the
Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act. In this connection, the
Court said,
''There is also a time-honored maxim of the
law which applies to this case, to wit: 'De minimis
non curat lex'.

* * * *
''If, for example, a customer spent $99 in Lit
Brothers' store for the purchase of 396 tubes of
'Ipana Tooth Paste' (a supply adequate for a
long lifetime) and upon the presentation to the
Stamp Company of the 990 trading stamps he received an article worth $1.75, he would be obtaining
in the form of merchandise a discount of 1.76%.
Applying this to each 25 cent purchase of tooth
paste, it would amount to four and 4/lOths mills
on that purchase. When the further facts are considered that this 'discount' is not in cash and that
fewer than 2/srds of the purchasers of commodities
at Lit Brothers' store ask for or accept trading
stamps, the infraction charged appears to be still
more trifling than above indicated'' ( 6 A. 2d 843,
848).
1

The infraction of which Mr. Bush might be guilty
if, in one case out of a thousand, the issuance of cash
discount stamps should violate the statute is, we submit
still more trifling. Furthermore, society would not be
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well served by convicting a merchant of a misdemeanor
because, in one case out of a thousand, his checkers
charged a fraction of a cent below cost on a pound of
coffee or a quart of salad dressing.
POINT II-PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE OUT A
PRIMA FACIE CASE BECAUSE CASH DISCOUNTS, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM TRADE
DISCOUNTS, DO NOT REDUCE PRICES.

Cash discount stamps are either an element of cost
or an element of price but not of both. No one suggests
that stamps are, at one and the same time, elements of
cost and price. Since our opponents cannot admit that
stamps are an element of cost and, in the same breath,
deny that they are covered by the statutory markup, they
are driven to contend that stamps are not an element of
cost at all but only of price. Baldly stated, they take the
position that all that Mr. Bush did was to mark his merchandise up 6% and then mark it right down again,
either 1.66% or 2.08%, depending upon whether the purchaser eventually redeemed his stamps in cash or merchandise.
The first answer to this facile argument is that the
element of costs cannot be avoided by simply ignoring it,
and neither can the fact that the statute made cost,
rather than price, the index to legality. The argument
not only fails to meet the real point at issue but it proceeds upon the wrong ground. We are not dealing here
with a price fixing statute. Food and Grocery Bureau
v. United States, 139 F. 2d 937 (C.C.A. 9th 1943).
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The second answer is that Mr. Bush did not in fact,
mark his merchandise down. He markea it up 6%, as
required by the statute, and it stayed there. He collected
the full markup in cash. The customer paid the same
whether he took stamps or not (R. 215-216). The price
remained unchanged.
But the Commission will argue that the stamps were
the equivalent of a discount and that a discount is the
equivalent of a price cut. This, it will be observed,
raises two questions : first, whether the stamps are the
equivalent of a discount, and, second, if they are,
whether a discount is the equivalent of a price cut.
The first question need not be argued, for the litigants are in agreement that cash discount stamps are
equivalent to a cash discount. The Sperry and Hutchinson Company contract makes this very plain (Pltf's Ex.
"A") ; the witnesses, Schirer and Kelley, so testified
(R. 173-174; 187-188); the Lower Court so found (Finding of Fact No. 6; R. 21); and there is a long line of
authority 'to sustain the finding. Thus, in State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 571 200 Pac. 894, 897 (1921), a case
involving S. & H. cash discount stamps, the Court said:

'' * * * Stamps were issued merely as a convenient means of allowing or granting a discount
to the merchant's customers on small as well as
on large purchases which were paid for in cash and
to identify the purchasers entitled to such a
discount.''
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So, also, in Food and Grocery Bureatt, Inc. v. Garfield. 20 Cal. 2d 228, 232, 125 P. 2d 3, 6 (1942) the Court
said,
''It is well settled by the decisions of this
court, as well as those in other jurisdictions, that
the practices of merchants in issuing trading
stamps with the purchases of articles is merely a
method of discounting bills in consideration for
the immediate payment of cash." (Citing cases
from eight jurisdictions.)

See also The Sperry and Hutchinson Company v. Hudson,
190 Ore. 458, 465, 226 P. 2d 501, 504 ( 1951).
1\Iany other authorities to the same effect could be
cited but the point is not in dispute.
The second question, whether a discount is equivalent
to a price cut, requires more time-consuming analysis,
for some discounts do and others do not have the effect
of cutting prices. The Lower Court found that the discount with which we are here concerned did have such
an effect (Finding of Fact No. 6; R. 21). With great
respect for the Lower Court, we beg to differ. It seems
quite clear to us that a contrary finding should have been
made, for we are dealing here with a cash discount rather
than a trade discount.
Trade discounts are a convenient means for adjusting prices. The purpose of a trade discount is to accommodate list prices to actual selling prices which are
determined by quantity, competitive factors and other
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considerations subject to change from time to time, but
without regard to terms of payment (R. 186). A quantity
discount is one of the most common forms.
Cash discounts, on the other hand, regulate the terms
of payment. Their purpose is to induce the customer to
make payment promptly so as to relieve the seller of the
necessity of borrowing working capital, to spare him the
expense of keeping books, to obviate losses on bad debts,
etc., as we have indicated on page 4, supra, and as the
record shows (R. 187).
If an article is priced at $1, less 2% for cash, the
customer who pays cash pays 98¢ net, the customer who
charges pays $1, and the customer whose account becomes overdue may eventually pay $1.02, but the price
remains the same in each case, viz. one dollar. The only
difference is that the customer who pays early is rewarded because of the savings that his promptness has
effected for the seller, and the customer who pays late is
made to bear the loss occasioned by his delay. One pays
less, and one pays more; but the price remains in each
case the same. The difference is required by capital considerations, not by any revision of the price. The price
is fixed and determined by the seller at the outset but the
amount of money paid is determined, within the limits
of the discount, by the buyer. It would seem quite illogical, we think, to hold that price is a fluctuating thing
that depends upon the time within which payment is
made.
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This distinction between trade discounts and cash
discounts is succinctly stated by Rosenkampff and Wider
in the "Theory of Accounts", 1942, at pages 478 and 488
as follows:
''Trade Discount on Sales. Many concerns
allow trade discounts on shipments made to customers. The reason for this procedure is that
prices in published catalogs are purposely established at high amounts in order that fluctuations
in prices may be measured from the list or catalog
prices by means of the trade discount, thereby
obviating the necessity of publishing new catalogs.
A trade discount is also used as a device to give
certain customers preference over others'' (p.
478).
''Cash Discount on Sales.-Strictly speaking,
a cash discount is a financial inducement to the
customer to pay bills on or before a date specified
in the sales invoice. A 1% or 2% discount, if
the bill is paid in 10 days, is a typical inducement. Consequently, it should be treated as a nonoperating item, rather than as a deduction from
the sales price" (p. 488).
The same distinction is recognized, for example, by
the United States Office of Contract Settlement (Termination cost memorandum 15-Journal of Accountancy,
V. 80, Sept. 1945, pp. 237-8) as follows:
"The term 'cash discount on purchases', as
used herein, refers to a reduction in the amount
paid to a vendor for the purchase of any items
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included in a termination settlement, solely by
reason of the payment therefor within a specified
period. It should be differentiated from trade discounts, rebates, and other allowances, which are
usually treated as a direct deduction from the purchase price of the items to which they relate."
Finally, this distinction between trade discounts and
cash discounts appears in the statute now under consideration, for, in defining "cost", the legislature specifically excluded trade discounts and included cash discounts, as follows :

''Cost de fined: * • * 3. When used in this
act, the term 'cost to the retailer' shall mean the
invoice cost of the merchandise to the retailer
* * * less all trade discounts 1except customary
discounts for cash; * * * '' (emphasis ours).
The legislative intent here is perfectly clear: In
determining his basic or actual cost, the statut.e requires
the retailer to deduct trade discounts, which represent a
reduction from list or catalogue price and, consequently,
are not true elements of cost, but forbids him to deduct
cash discounts, which merely compensate him for making
payment in cash, and, consequently, are true elements
of cost. Translating this into terms of price, for that
is the subject now under consideration, we believe that
"invoice cost" can be read as "list price" and that the
legislature intended to establish, as the first basic element, the actual price paid by the retailer for the merchandise. It recognized that trade discounts reduce price
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but that cash discounts relate only to the terms of payment. Accordingly, in the computation of price it eliminated the former as an element but retained the latter;
it adjusted the list price on the one hand and compensated for the cash discounts on the other so as to arrive
at the actual price of the merchandise.
In doing this, we submit that the legislature not only
indicated that it was well aware of the distinction between trade discounts and cash discounts but that it
established, as a matter of legislative policy, that cash
discounts were not to be considered to reduce prices. In
the light of this legislative policy, it is difficult to see
why a cash discount should be treated one way in the
case of a purchase at wholesale and in quite the opposite
way in the case of a purchase at retail.
Granted that ''the life of the law has not been
logic", how can it be said that cash discounts do not
affect wholesale prices but do affect retail prices~ The
purpose of the discount is the same in each case. The
result is the same in each case. Surely if the retailer
is forbidden to deduct cash discounts in determining the
price at which he buys his merchandise, he cannot be
compelled to deduct cash discounts in determining the
price at which he sells his merchandise. If he is obliged
to consider his purchase price $1.00, rather than 98¢,
even though he has received a discount of 2% for cash,
surely he should not be obliged to consider his selling
price 98¢, rather than $1.00, when he allows a discount
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of 2% for cash. Yet, this is the way in which our opponents and the Lower Court have interpreted the
statute.
If the stamps were nothing more than gifts, they
would, of course, fall into the category of a trade discount and constitute a price cut, but, as we have repeatedly indicated, they are not gifts: they are not something for nothing. The law on this point has been settled
by Food and Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. Oar field, 20 Cal. 2d
228; 125 P. 2d 3 (1942) and confirmed by Weco Products
Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores (Garfield), 55 Cal.
App. 2d 684; 131 P. 2d 856 (1943). Both of these cases
attacked the practice of Mr. Garfield, a retail merchant,
in issuing trading stamps to his cash customers at the
rate of one stamp for each 10¢ purchase. These were
his own stamps and he redeemed them himself either in
cash or merchandise, but the system was the same, in
substance, as The Sperry and Hutchi11:son Cooperative
Cash Discount System which is the subject of the present
suit. The redemption value in Mr. Garfield's case
was 2% in cash or 2.5% in merchandise. In the first
case, which was prosecuted under the California Unfair
Practices Act, the plaintiff contended that Garfield's
stamps were gifts. The Court rejected this contention,
saying:
"It must be concluded, therefore, that the
trading stamp plan adopted by the appellant does
not constitute the making of a gift of $1 in cash
or $1.25 in merchandise but is a discount given
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the customer in consideration of his paying cash.''
(125 P. 2d 3, 7.)
In the second case, which was prosecuted under the
California Fair Trade Act, the plaintiff contended that
Garfield's stamps had the effect of cutting prices on fair
trade articles. The Court rejected this contention, also,
saying:
"Are they [trading stamps] to be regarded
as a discount for cash, as a means of advertising,
a device to entice customers and to retain their
trade, or do they simply represent a cut in the sale
price of the articles with which they are given?
If the latter, they accomplish a cut in the established price of merchandise; and where such merchandise is sold at minimum Fair Trade Act prices,
the giving of trading stamps then amounts to a
sale below such prices.
"If, however, the stamps are given by the merchant in the nature of an inducement to customers
to attract them to his store, the practice is in the
nature of an advertising device, and is no more
to be condemned as violative of the Fair Trade
Act than would be such commonly employed devices as free parking room, care of infants and
other plans offered by some mercantile establishments in competition with their rivals. Free
parking for automobiles of customers might be
said to result in a lesser price paid by a customer
for goods purchased, yet it could hardly be reasonably contended that thereby a violation of the Fair
Trade Act had been worked.
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"Neither can it be asserted that by giving
discounts for cash the terms of the statute in question are contravened. A cash discount is a reward for prompt payment. It is a trade practice
long established, and is authoritatively recognized
as being not a deduction from the purchase price.
Montgomery Auditing Theory and Practice (pp.
499-500).
"Consideration of such authorities as are
available leads us to the conclusion that the giving
of trading stamps as in the instance now before
us does not effect a reduction in the price of the
articles sold such as to constitute a violation of
the Fair Trade Act * * * ''

* * * *
"It is true that the Food and Grocery Bureau
case involved a different statute, the Unfair Practices Act rather than the Fair Trade Act, but the
ruling of the Court must be regarded as conclusive
of the status of the trading stamp in commercial
retail business'' ( 131 P. 2d 856, 858).

''To denominate appellant's trading stamp
plan as a device for giving a cash discount on merchandise, rather than as a cut in price upon the
article sold, gains force when we consider that
the stamps are given uniformly and without regard
to the type of goods sold or the purchaser of the
same. The only condition is that cash be paid for
the purchases'' ( 131 P. 2d 856, 859).
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Here, therefore, in companion cases we find the answers to both of the questions which control the present
controversy, if it is viewed from the price point of view.
In the first case the use of trading stamps was held to be
equivalent to a cash discount; and in the second case it
was held that such a cash discount did not have the effect
of cutting prices.
Here, also, we find the origin of the present controversy and come, right to the heart of the matter, for it
was the Attorney General's reliance on the first of these
two cases and his disregard of the second that precipitated the present dispute. Apparently asked, generally,
whether trading stamps violated the Fair Trade Act or
the Unfair Practices Act, he replied to Mr. Hale, Executive-Secretary of the Trade Commission, on May 21, 1951,
that, in his opinion, they did, if they had the effect of
reducing the prices, in the one case below the ''minimum
resale price'' and in the other case below ''cost'' as defined by the Act. As authority for this, he cited the
Food and Grocery case, saying that the only reasonable
inference which could be drawn from the court's decision
was that if the redeemable value of the trading stamps
had reduced the price of the merchandise below cost, it
would have constituted a violation of the Unfair Practices Act ( Opitnion of the Attorney Oeneral, May 21,
1951). Unfortunately, he overlooked the Weco Products case which held that cash discount stamps, despite
their redeemable value, do not have the effect of reducing price.
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The Attorney General did not say that stamps cut
prices but that is what Mr. Hale understood him to say
and that is the assumption upon which the Trade Commission based the prosecution of this enforcement proceeding. Taking its cue directly from the Attorney
General's conclusion that "if the redeemable value of
the trading stamps reduces the price . . . below cost",
they violate the Unfair Practices Act, the Trade Commission issued a cease and desist order on May 28, 1951,
(one week after the Attorney General's opinion), which
recited that '' S. & H. Green Stamps with their redeemable value did reduce the sale price of the commodities
below cost", and called upon Mr. Bush to refrain from
issuing them.
It is difficult to comprehend how the Attorney General could have misunderstood the Food and Grocery
decision or how he could have overlooked the Weco Products decision, but it is easy to understand how Mr. Hale,
misinformed of the significance of the first case and
uninformed of the existence of the latter, proceeded upon
a false assumption.
The Attorney General of Oklahoma under similar
circumstances, after reviewing the Food and Grocery
decision and the Weco Products decision said, in an opinion dated May 8, 1950, of which we shall be pleased to
provide copies to the Court :

'' * * • The weight of law, logic and reason,
as declared by decisions of the various courts,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
holds clearly and distinctly to the view that the
practice of giving trading stamps • • • does not
amount to nor will it sustain a charge of, price
cutting.''
The Attorney General of Oklahoma also discussed at
length B ristol-lll eyers Co. v. Lit. Bros., supra, wherein the
Court said,
"It is clear to us that the practice indulged
in by Lit Brothers, of issuing trading stamps with
the sales of its merchandise falls within the sphere
of legitimate competition and does not constitute
a 'selling [of] any commodity at less than the
price stipulated' and that it is not 'unfair competition' within the meaning of the act appellant
invokes. To come within the prohibitions of the
act, Lit Brothers would have to either (1) cut
directly the price of the commodities within the
act's protection, or (2) accomplish the same result
in respect to the commodities by a device which
was a palpable subterfuge resorted to for the
purpose of circumventing the law" (6 A. 2d 843,
847-8).
Upon reason, authority, and as a matter of statutory
construction, we respectfully submit that the Lower
Court was in error in finding that the stamps which Mr.
Bush issued to his cash customers had the effect of cutting prices; that, on the contrary, they had no such effect;
and, finally, that the authority upon which the Attorney
General relied and upon which the Trade Commission
acted stood for no such proposition.
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POINT III -PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE OUT A
PRIMA FACIE CASE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT
PROVE THAT DEFENDANT MADE ANY SALES
FOR THE PURPOSE OF INJURING COMPETITORS AND DESTROYING COMPETITION.

We come now- to the question of wrongful intent.
If an act, such as the sale of milk below a definitely
fixed price, is prohibited by the State in the exercise of
its police power, one can be convicted of a violation if,
in fact, he sells below the fixed price, no matter how good
his intentions may have been and no matter how innocent
his purpose (N ebbia v. New York, 291 U. S., 502, 78 L. Ed.
940 [1934] ). But, if an act, such as the sale of merchandise below cost is prohibited and the definition of
''cost'' is uncertain, one cannot be convicted of a violation just because he sells below cost but only if he does
so with wrongful intent; that is to say, for the purpose
of injuring his competitors and destroying competition.
The reason for this distinction between a statute
prohibiting the sale of a certain commodity below a fixed
price and a statute prohibiting the sale of merchandise in
general below cost is that, in the one case, a man can
easily tell when he is violating the law, for there is no
uncertainty about it, but in the other case, it is difficult for
him to know when he is and when he is not violating the
law, for there is a great deal of uncertainty about it.
Accordingly, in the case of the anti-price discrimination and unfair practice acts the law has become well
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settled that there must not only be an act, a sale at a discriminatory price or below cost, but there must also be
a wrongful intent. The underlying reason for this, to
repeat, is that, under broad regulatory statutes of this
kind, it is so difficult for a merchant to know whether he
is transgressing some regulation with which the legislature has seen fit to guide him, that it is unfair to convict him on the basis of an innocent or unwitting and
unintended misinterpretation of the law. (Daniel Loughran Co., Inc. v. Lord B.altimore etc. Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A.
2d 201 [1941] ). The present case perfectly illustrates
the wisdom of the rule.
As the Court said in Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla.
585, 208 P. 2d 538 ( 1949), after referring to many earlier
decisions from other states construing unfair practices
acts,
"From all of the cases cited it appears that
wherever the statute contained the words 'with
intent or effect' or 'with the intent, effect, or
result,' etc., and the constitutionality of the Act
was challenged on that ground or on that ground
with others, such Act is generally held to be unconstitutional" (208 P. 2d 538, 544).
For an interesting discussion of this point, see
Thatcher: "The Constitutionality of the Unfiair-Practices Acts", 25 Oregon Law Review, 250-255. See also
Commonwealth v. Zaslo If, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. 2d 67
(1940); St.ate v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P.
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2d 650 (1941); State ex rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb.
335, 181 N.W. 607 (1938).
In the case at bar the Act under consideration permitted, in the alternative, proof either of a wrongful intent or a harmful effect, for it made it unlawful to sell
below cost "for the purpose of injuring competitors and
destroying competition* * *or when the effect of selling
at less than cost * * * may be substantially to lessen
competition * * *." Similarly, in its complaint, the
Trade Commission alleged, in the alternative, that the
sales complained of were made either "for the purpose
of injuring competitors or the effect thereof was and will
be to substantially lessen competition".
Recognizing, however, that it would not be enough
under the Unfair Practices Act to prove, in the alternative, a wrongful intent or a harmful effect, counsel for
the plaintiffs conceded at the trial that ''an essential
element of proof that we must bear here is that these
sales * * *were made with the intent to injure competitors" (R. 68).
This also was the position taken by the Trial Court
which said,
''Under our statute the selling of merchandise
below the legal price must be coupled with the intent to injure competition within the same trade
area to constitute conduct on the part of the merchant which is unlawful and subjects said merchant
to an injunction" (Memo Decision, R. 16).
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Both on reason and authority therefore, it is plain
that in addition to sales below cost, it was incumbent
upon plaintiffs to show as part of their prima facie case
that such sales were made by the defendant ''for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition.'' The Trial Court found that the plaintiffs had
sustained this burden (Finding of Fact No. 10, R. 22).
We respectfully submit that there is no evidence to support such a finding.
(a) Defendant's intent was only to attract busimess

generally: to meet competition, not to injure his
competitors and destroy competition.
No claim is made in this case that there is anything
reprehensible about the use of S. & H. cash discount
stamps. As the Court said in Ex parte Hutchinson, 137
Fed. 949 (1904),
''The giving of trading stamps is merely one
way of discounting bills in consideration of
immediate payment of cash which is a common
practice of merchants and is doubtless a popular
method and advantageous to all concerned and it
is not obnoxious to public policy" (p. 949).
Speaking of S. & H. stamps, the Court in Winston v.
Beeson, 135 N. C. 271, 283, 47 S. E. 457, 461 (1904) said:
''The plan as outlined in the verdict seems to
be one for advertising the merchant's business and
his wares and enabling him to sell his goods for
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cash instead of on time. This, it must be conceded
is an advantage to him. It is also a benefit to the
customer who practically receives a discount and
who will buy more cautiously and judiciously if he
pays cash and will spend only according to his
means.''
Similarly, no claim is made in this case that it was
reprehensible or illegal for Mr. Bush to install the S. & H.
Co-operative Cash Discount System in his store so as to
secure to himself and his customers the benefits available
under that system.
In the conduct of his business, Mr. Bush had certain
competitive handicaps: he did not extend credit, take
telephone orders, make deliveries or provide free parking. To meet these competitive practices he simply installed a storewide cash discount. His intent was the
same when he issued S. & H. stamps on merchandise
marked up 16% as it was when he issued them on merchandise marked up only 6% (R. 53): namely, to allow
a cash discount on everything for the purpose of stimulating his trade, advertising his business, and meeting his
competition.
To charge that Mr. Bush had some sinister purpose
in issuing cash discount stamps on 6% items, that he
issued such stamps on such items, as contrasted with
others at higher markups, ''for the purpose of injuring
competitors and destroying competition'' is ludicrous.
If there was any violation of the Act, which we deny, it
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could only have been incidental, not purposeful. It simply makes no sense at all to contend that Mr. Bush in. .
tended to injure his competitors and destroy competition
when he issued cash discount stamps with a quart of salad
dressing marked up 6% but that he had no such intent
when he issued them with a can of beans marked up
8.08%. The storewide application of the discount negates
any supposed intention to sell particular items below
statutory cost.

Balzer v. Caler, 74 P. 2d 839, atf'd, 11 Cal. App. 2d
663, 82 P. 2d 19 (1938), was a suit brought to enjoin a
retail grocer from selling certain staple merchandise,
such as Kellogg's Corn Flakes, slightly below cost in
violation of the California Unfair Competition Act which
prohibited such sales when made for the purpose of
injuring competitors and destroying competition. There
was no question about the sales having been made below
cost, for defendant admitted it, but he denied that he
made such sales for the purpose of injuring competitors
and destroying competition. Upon a finding that the
sales were made "with the sole purpose of advertising
his business, improving his trade, and stimulating interest on the part of customers in those products and in his
business, and not with the intention of injuring competitors or destroying competition'', the Court denied the
injun<{tion and dismissed the action. Affirming the
judgment on appeal, the Court said,
"Plaintiff failed to prove a cause of action
against him. It was a necessary element of the
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illegal selling of goods for less than cost, as the
statute existed when this case was tried, that the
act be performed with the purpose of injuring
competitors and destroying competition. The burden was on the plaintiff to establish that unlawful
purpose. The record in this case is devoid of any
such evidence. The court specifically found that
the respondent did not sell the goods below cost
with that purpose in view. On the contrary, the
court found that he sold the goods below cost for
the sole purpose of advertising his grocery business and to stimulate trade" (74 P. 2d 839, 843).
Notwithstanding that the Lower Court in the case
at bar found that Mr. Bush did intend to injure competitors and destroy competition, the testimony showed
that Mr. Bush's only intent was to advertise his grocery
business and to stimulate trade. He so testified repeatedly, and neither the facts nor the circumstances
contradicted him. See also Sandler v. Gordon, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 254, 210 P. 2d 314 (1949); State v. 20th Century
Market, 236 Wis. 215, 294 N.W. 873 (1940).
There was, we submit, no proof that Mr. Bush intended to injure his competitors or destroy competition
but only that he employed a perfectly legitimate method,
a cash discount, to meet the equally legitimate competitive practices of the credit and delivery type of merchant
engaged in the same business.
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(b) Defendant cannot be held to have intended to
incite price cuts or a price war, nor can he be
held responsible for the acts of his competitors,
legal or illegal.

In lieu of any proof of a wrongful intent on Mr.
Bush's part, our opponents sought to prove some sort of
quasi intent by making him responsible for a price war in
the retail grocery business in Ogden. Their theory in
this regard was that since a man must intend the ordinary
consequences of his acts, and since a price war is the
ordinary consequence of the use of S. & H. stamps, Mr.
Bush must have intended to set off a price war in order
to drive his weaker competitors out of business (R. 67-69).
The testimony offered in support of this line of
attack was signally unsuccessful. All that it showed was
that on July 21, 1951, eight months or more after Mr.
Bush had inaugurated his cash discount, Stimpson's
Market, which had already established a record for price
cutting and had been ordered to desist (R. 62), cut its
prices 2¢ on everything that the Bush Super Market had
in its windows; Bush cut to meet Stimpson, and so the
prices went progressively lower for three days, after
which Bush gave up and Stimpson's, returning to the old
prices, established a 3% cash discount on everything in
its store. About a month later, other large stores in
Ogden established prices at 3% below Stimpson's handbill or list prices (R. 72-73).
If this constituted proof that the ordinary consequence of the use of S. & H. cash discount stamps is to
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cause a price war and that Mr. Bush must therefore be
considered to have intended to incite such an event, it
certainly took a long time to get started ( 8 months !) , and
Mr. Bush showed very little stomach for it (about 3
days!). What we really think the testimony showed, and
no more, was that Stimpson's unnecessarily initiated a
contest with Bush when all it needed to meet Bush's cash
discount was a cash discount of its own which quickly
restored its lost volume (R. 73).
If the ordinary consequence of the use of S. & H.
cash discount stamps were to incite a price war, there
would be over 30,000 such price wars raging at the
moment throughout the United States, but no such phenomenon has come to our attention or was referred to at
the trial, and no reference will be found to it in the cases.
We should also point out, again, that if Mr. Bush
violated the law when he issued S. & H. cash discount
stamps, which we deny, he only did so perhaps once in a
thousand sales, when 6% items alone were sold, and that
it is absurd to suggest that such occasional sales could
have engulfed the local grocery trade in a price war or
that Mr. Bush could be held to have intended any such
consequence.
Furthermore, even assuming that there was a price
war in the retail grocery business in Ogden and not just
in the mind of counsel for the plaintiffs in intervention,
no fault could be found with Mr. Bush if the "war" was
inspired by his unquestionably legal use of S. & H. cash
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discount stmnps on the bulk of his merchandise, nor could
any fault be found with him in so far as the "war" related to items selling above the 6o/o level. At the very
most, fault could be found with Mr. Bush to the extent
that the "war" was inspired by his use of S. & H. cash
discount stamps in connection with the sale of 6% merchandise and only in so far as the "war" had the effect
of cutting prices below the 6% level, where it would have
run afoul of the Unfair Practices Act. On these matters
the record is entirely silent and proof gives way to pure
speculation.
Plaintiffs' argument, step by step, is that because
the so-called price war followed· defendant's use of cash
discount stamps, it was caused by the stamps ; and because it was caused by the stamps, it was the ordinary
consequence of the use of the stamps; and because it was
the ordinary consequence of the use of the stamps, defendant must have intended it to occur; and because a
price war adversely affects the industry, it injures competitors and destroys competition ; and because of this,
defendant must be found to have made use of the stamps
for the purpose of injuring his competitors and destroying competition. This is fantastic!
When one considers that we are dealing with a penal
statute and that a man is presumed to have acted without wrongful intent until the contrary is proved, it is
apparent that this whole phase of the evidence is weak,
inconclusive, meaningless, and certainly inadequate and
inappropriate to the task for which it was intended.
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Even in its broadest construction, it proved nothing with
respect to Mr. Bush's intent.
(c) Plaintiffs failed to carry the burden of proving
that defendant issued 8. & H. cash discount

stamps for the purpose of injuring his competitors and destroying competition.
As we have already shown, supra, at page 45, the
plaintiffs were required to prove that defendant's actual
intent. in issuing S. & H. cash discount stamps was to injure his competitors and destroy competition; and that,
in lieu of such proof, it would not be enough to prove
merely the e ff.ect of his use of the stamps. In final
analysis, all they had to rely upon was their theory that
it was wrong for Mr. Bush to issue cash discount stamps
with 6% items because the effect was to sell merchandise
below cost. This, however, was not enough to prove a
wrongful intent, even if such sales were below cost.
In Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Sawyers
Stores, Inc., 114 Mont. 562, 568, 138 P. 2d 964, 968 (1943),
the Court said :
"The commission relied on its proof of the
sales and the testimony of competitors as to the
effect generally of price cutting as showing the
unlawful intent. Proof of sales at less than cost,
if that had been established by the evidence, would
not in itself be proof of the unlawful purpose to
injure competitors and destroy competition. No
presumption of such purpose arises from the mere
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fact of such a sale being made. It is necessary to
go further and show other facts and circumstances
that would furnish basis for a conclusion of the
wrongful purpose.''
See: State v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432,
201 P. 2d 1034 (1949); Great A. & P. Te.a Co. v. Ervin,
23 F. Supp. 70 (1938) ; Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc.,
122 Colo. 263, 221 P. 2d 343 ( 1950).
In truth and in fact, plaintiffs defaulted on the issue
of intent and their counsel virtually admitted as much at
the close of the whole case when, in a colloquy with the
Court, he revealed that his real theory was that, if the
Act were interpreted to forbid the use of cash discount
stamps with 6% items, he would consider defendant to
have had a wrongful intent (to have acted unfairly), but
if the Act were interpreted not to forbid such a practice,
he would consider defendant to have had no wrongful
intent, no matter what consequences flowed from his use
of the stamps. If this is a correct view of the matter, no
useful purpose will ever be served by attempting to prove
or disprove intent in such a case as this.
The colloquy to which we refer and which shows that
the Trial Court shared our opponent's erroneous view of
the question of intent, may be set forth as follows:
By the Court : ''Of course, purs1;1ing this line
of thought a little bit further, it is obvious also if
another competitor of Mr. Bush's engages in a
program of selling and adapts himself to certain
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facilities which may be available to him, that by
the same token Mr. Bush is hurt just as much by
that method as the other merchant is by Mr.
Bush's.''
Mr. Rampton: "There is no question about
that, your Honor, but the difference is this: Our
legislature has set up certain things that they said
are unfair.
By the Court: That's right.
Mr. Rampton: Now, things that are fair, that
is legitimate competition.
By the Court: That's right.
Mr. Rampton: And you can't be blamed for
hurting your competitor.
By the Court: Eventually, you are going to
have to decide whether Mr. Bush's method is unfair, and as a result the State law will have to be
interpreted in that regard" (R. 225-226).
This, we submit, is all there was to plaintiffs' prima
facie case in so far as it related to intent. If cash discount stamps were not proscribed by the Act, the Court
and counsel for the plaintiffs would consider Mr. Bush's
intent unobjectionable; but if stamps were proscribed,
they would then consider his intent to have been wrongful. Plaintiffs might as well have refrained from going
into the question of intent at all. Their theory, we submit, was unsound; their proof, lacking.
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POINT IV -THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS
CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
AND THE CORRESPONDING SECTIONS (ARTICLE I, SECS. 1 AND 7) OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION.

In our first three points we endeavored to show that
defendant, in fact, never violated the Unfair Practices
Act.

We come now to our final point which has to do
with the constitutionality of the Act.
(a) The Act, if construed to cover

ALL .of the costs
of the credit ,and delivery merchatnt. but only
SOME of the costs of the cash .a;nd oarry merchant, is wnconstitutional.

In Point I we argued that the statutory markup was
intended to cover all of the costs of the cash and carry
merchant, just as it was intended to cover ~all of the costs
of the credit and delivery merchant. We ask the Court
now to consider the constitutional consequence of rejecting that argument.

If the statutory markup covers all of the costs of the
credit and delivery merchant but only some of the costs
of the cash and carry merchant, the statute clearly discriminates against the latter in favor of the former. It
is fundamental that, where, as here, there is no reasonable basis for discriminating as between two classes of
competing merchants, any statute which has such an
effect is unconstitutional because it denies one of them
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the equal protection of the law. (State v. H oltgreve, 58
Utah 563, 571, 200 Pac. 894 (1921); M·ayflower Farms v.
TenEyck, 297 U.S. 266, 80 L. Ed. 675 (1936).)
In our opinion, Point I provides a complete answer
to this law suit and it is one on which we would prefer
to stand because it does not entail the invalidation of the
Act, but, if we are overruled on Point I, we submit that
the present point will be unanswerable: the statute cannot be unfairly discriminatory and constitutional at the
same time.
(b) If a cash discount is :an element, of price r.ather

than cost, the Act is unconstitutional because it
makes no allowance for t.he difference in the
overhead of the cas:h and carry merchant as compared with the overhead of the credit and delivery merchant..
In Point II we argued that the function of a cash
discount, as distinguished from a trade discount, is not
to adjust price but to induce the purchaser to pay cash;
that a cash discount affects the terms not the price. Here,
again, we ask the Court to consider the constitutional
consequence of rejecting our argument.
Cash discount stamps are either an element of cost,
as we think, or an element of price, as our opponents
suggest, but not of both. No one suggests that stamps
are at one and the same time elements of cost and price.
If cash discount stamps are an element of cost, as we
think, the cost of supplying them occupies the same place
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in the overhead of the cash and carry merchant that the
cost of extending credit occupies in the overhead of the
credit and ·delivery merchant. In other words, the cost
of a cash discount and the cost of extending credit are
related. This view, which we have held from the outset
of the present controversy, is reflected in the following
quotation from Rosenkamp:ff and Wider in the ''Theory
of Accounts'', page 486 :
''The presence of the financial and time elements, furthermore, makes the [cash] discount
earned closely approximate interest. This similarity is even more pronounced in those cases
where money is borrowed at the bank in order to
take advantage of such purchase discounts. The
interest paid on such borrowings is charged to
interest expense and is treated as a deduction from
income in the non-operating section of the income
statement; hence, the cash discount on purchases
should appear in the non-operating section as
other income.''
If stamps are not an element of cost, it means that
there is no financial expense for the cash and carry merchant which corresponds to that element of the financial
expense of the credit and delivery merchant which is attributable to the extension of credit. It means that the
cash discount allowed by the former does not figure as
a non-operating expense but is reflected, instead, by a
reduction in sales. The consequence of this is that the
overhead of the cash and carry merchant is lower than
the overhead of the credit and delivery merchant by
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reason of the absence of this particular item of nonoperating expense, and, for this reason, the cash and
carry merchant should be permitted to charge correspondingly lower prices for his merchandise. For its
failure to compensate for this difference, the statute is
arbitrary and discriminatory in its effect, and, hence,
contravenes the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In Florida Dry Cleaning~ Laundry Board v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380 (1939), the
Court had before it, the question of the reasonableness
of laundry and dry cleaning prices fixed by a Florida
Administrative Board. It held that, in determining
prices the Board was under a duty to take into consideration the differences in cost between credit and delivery
establishments, on the one hand, and cash and carry
establishments, on the other.
In Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio 519, 76
N. E. 2d 91 (1947), the Court invalidated an Ohio
statute prohibiting sales of cigarettes below cost because
it failed to provide for the difference in overhead
between the wholesaler of cigarettes who did business
on the credit and delivery plan and the wholesaler
who did business on the cash and carry plan. As in
the case at bar, the statute defined "cost" to the wholesaler as invoice or replacement cost less trade discounts, except customary discounts for cash, plus an
arbitrary markup in the absence of proof of a lower
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actual cost. In invalidating the statute the Trial Court
said,
''The unreasonableness of the foregoing formula [2% markup] appears in bold relief when it
is considered that although the specified markup is
inadequate to cover actual cost, nevertheless it constitutes the. maximum markup required by the
statute. Regardless of how much higher the wholesaler's actual cost may be, he is not required
to increase his markup to correspond thereto.
This maximum markup of 2% is disproportionally lower than actual maximum costs of Service
Wholesalers and it bears no true relation to the
average cost of all wholesalers. This is exemplified by the evidence and other data submitted
to the court.
''The differentials in cost of the two classes
of wholesalers in question are ignored by the statute with the result that instead of minimum prices
fairly based upon different costs, the same minimum price is available to cash and carry and service wholesalers alike." (Emphasis ours.) (74 N. E.
2d 841, 849.)
More recently, in Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80
A. 2d 267 (1951), the Court of Appeals of Maryland
invalidated for this same reason a Maryland statute
prohibiting sales below cost. The Maryland Act was in
all material respects similar to the Utah Act now under
discussion, and required wholesalers to apply a markup
of 2% to cover overhead in the absence of direct evidence of a lesser cost. For failure to make allowance
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for the difference in overhead of the cash and carry
wholesaler as compared with the credit and delivery
wholesaler, the Court declared the Maryland statute
·unconstitutional, saying,
"We conclude that the Unfair Sales Act, particularly Section 112, as embodied in Section 113,
is unreasonable, arbitrary and unjustly discriminatory, as between plaintiffs and defendant" {p.
278).
In our opinion, Point II provides a complete answer
to this lawsuit, and it is one on which we would prefer
to stand because it does not entail the invalidation of the
Act, but, if we are overruled on Point II, we submit that
the present point will be unanswerable. If cash discounts affect prices only, and do not figure as an element of cost, the overhead of the cash and carry merchant is thrown out of relation with the overhead of the
credit and delivery merchant and there should be a compensating factor in the Act which would permit the cash
and carry merchant to charge lower prices. For want
of it, the Act is unconstitutional.
(c) The Act, if construed only to prohibit the use of

8. <f; H. cash discount stamps, is unconstitutio'TIJal
because it discriminates against a legitimate
business.
Counsel for the Utah Retail Grocers' Association,
who carried nearly the whole burden of the trial for the
plaintiffs, endeavored to make this enforcement proceed-
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ing appear to be a public spirited effort to save the retail
grocery business in Ogden from the disintegrating and
demoralizing effect of a price war incited by the defendant's use of cash discount stamps (R. 67).
We believe that we have already demonstrated that
this is nonsense, but let us add to what we have already
said on the subject at pages 49 to 52, supra, that the
alleged price war did not even get under way until long
after this proceeding had been initiated.
The first step, apparently, was an effort on the part
of the Retail Grocers Association to bring Mr. Bush into
line, for that was the usual course (R. 91).
The second step, apparently, was a complaint by Mr.
Boyle, President of the Association, to Mr. Hale, Executive Secretary of the Trade Commission (R. 91-92).
The third step, apparently, was a request by Mr.
Hale to the Attorney General of Utah for an opinion with
respect to whether the issuance of S . .& H. green trading
stamps in connection with sales was a violation of the
Fair Trade Act or the Unfair Practices Act (R. 129).
The date of this request does not appear, but the opinion
was issued on May 21, 1951.
The fourth step, apparently, was an interview between Mr. Hale and the defendant's store manager, Mr.
Winters (R. 129). This appears to have taken place on
May 24, 1951, when Mr. Hale purchased certain 6% items
(complaint, paragraph 3).
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The fifth step, apparently, was the issuance of a
cease and desist order by the Trade Commission. This
took place on May 28.
It was not until nearly two months later, July 21,
1951, that Stimpson's first cut its prices in the opening
round of the alleged price war (R. 72).
With this chronology of events in mind it will be
obvious that the talk of an alleged price war was intended merely to obscure the real purpose of the proceeding. The real purpose was not to rescue the retail
grocery business from a price war nor to prevent Mr.
Bush from issuing S. & H. cash discount stamps with
6% items, but to compel him to give up the use of such
stamps entirely. Here was the real animus : the Retail
Grocers' Association wanted to drive S. & H. cash discount stamps out of the retail grocery business in Ogden.
Not only was the statute never intended for such a
purpose but, if it had been it would clearly have been
unconstitutional, for the business of The Sperry &
Hutchinson Company in providing and redeeming its
stamps, so that retail merchants and their customers
may enjoy the benefits of a cooperative cash discount, is
a legitimate business which serves a useful purpose and,
hence, may not be made the subject of discriminatory
legislation. As this Court said in State v. H oltgreve,
58 Utah, 563, 572; 200 Pac. 894, 897 (1921), in striking
down a tax which sought to discriminate against S. & H.
stamps,
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'' • • • In our judgment the great weight of
authority is against the validity of laws which
either directly or indirectly prohibit or unduly
interfere with the right to use trading stamps such
as are in question here and which are supplied for
the purposes stipulated • • •. ''
A host of other decisions upholding the use of cash
discount stamps in the face of attack by special interests
could be cited but the point is one which our opponents
can hardly dispute and we shall therefore content ourselves with the following quotations from one of the leading California decisions (Ex Parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763,
82 Pac. 429 [1905] ) .
"We see nothing in such a stamp or coupon
which is outside of the constitutional rights of
citizens to make contracts concerning property;
nothing which wrongfully interferes with the lawful rights of other persons ; and nothing which the
police power can reach as touching the public
safety, the public health, or the public morals.
(82 Pac. 429, 431.)

• • • •
''Indeed, an ordinary trading-stamp or coupon is in substance a mere form of allowing discounts on cash payments, and its issuance is
entirely harmless and within the constitutional
right of contract. It may be distasteful to certain
competitors in business; but the latter should remember that if a statute suppressing it be upheld
then other oppressive statutes might be enacted
unlawfully interfering with and hampering busi-
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ness and the right of contract to which these competitors would strenuously but vainly object."
(82 Pac. 429, 434.)
Not only are we quite certain that the Unfair Practices Act was not intended to outlaw cash discount
stamps, but we are satisfied that, if it had attempted such
a thing, it would have to be declared unconstitutional.
Their use may be regulated, as, indeed, it is (Title 96,
Utah Code Annotated 1943) but not prohibited.
(d) The Act, if construed to permit conviction upon

proof, in the alternative, of a wrongful intent or
a harmful ·effect., is unconstitutional.
Section 16-A-4-7 of the Act provides that it shall be
unlawful for any person to sell any article at less than
cost ''for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition * * * or when the elf ect of selling
* * * at less than cost may be substantially to lessen
competition.'' Literally construed, it is evident that a
retailer who made sales below cost without any purpose
of injuring competitors or destroying competition could
be convicted of a violation of the statute upon proof that
the effect of his sales might be substantially to lessen
competition. As we have indicated at pages 42-44, supra,
the courts have repeatedly held that proof, in the alternative, of a wrongful purpose or a harmful effect is not
enough: there must be proof of a wrongful purpose.
Since our opponents, as we have indicated at page 44,
supra, do not contest this point, we shall do no more here
than to call the attention of the Court to Englebrecht v.
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Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 P. 2d 538 (1949), and Adwon v.
Oklahoma Retailers Association, 204 Okla. 199, 228 P. 2d
376 (1951).
In the first of these cases, which contains a comprehensive review of the authorities, the Court invalidated
the Unfair Sales Act of Oklahoma because it permitted
conviction upon proof, in the alternative, of intent or
effect.
In the second, the Court sustained the Unfair Sales
Act of Oklahoma after it had been amended so as to
remove the objectionable alternative which permitted
conviction without proof of intent.
(e) The Act is unconstitutional in any event because

it is so vagtte and Vndefinite that the ret:ail merchant is unable to .ascertain when he is violating
the law and, consequently, expositng !hims.elf to
conviction of a misdemeanor atnd running the
risk of a fine, imprisonment a;nd. liability for
civil damages.
The Utah Unfair Practices Act, like many of its
fellows in other jurisdictions, was modeled on the California Unfair Practices Act of 1935·, as amended in 1937,
and is subject to the same constitutional shortcomings.
The time for challenging such acts upon the ground that
they exceed the police power of the state, seems to have
passed (Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National
Candy and Tobacco Co., Inc., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 82 P. 2d 3
[1938]), but the time for challenging them for the in-
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definiteness and uncertainty of their regulatory provisions is still very much with us.
After reviewing the cases in which such challenges
have been made, the author of "The Constitutionality of
the Unfair-Practices Acts" in the Oregon Law Review to
which we have already referred at page 41, supr.a, said:
'' * * * in their present statutory forms, the enforcement of these acts, in the absence of a standard (either
within or without the acts) for resolution of the myriad
problems of apportionment of overhead expense which
confront every merchant, is so highly conjectural that,
it is submitted, the prohibitions of the acts are too vague,
arbitrary, and uncertain to be supportable under due
process" (p. 263), and then went on to say that, "Without exception, every case which has sustained the salesbelow-cost provisions of an unfair-practices act has been
based upon a record factually incomplete, the issue
having arisen upon demurrer, motion, or certified question. Under those circumstances the courts' reluctance
to pronounce a violation of the principles of due process
is understandable, and in some instances may have been
justifiable. Other courts, in contrast have not needed
the elucidation of a factual record of the insuperable
obstacles confro~ting a merchant who attempts to comply
with these statutes" ( p. 269).
Considered against the background of the constitutional struggle to which the foregoing attests, it is evident that the challenge leveled by the present defendant
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at the present Act was a serious one; that it nearly succeeded below is equally evident from the following pregnant observation by the Trial Court:
''From the evidence in this record, the Court
makes the observation that the Unfair Practices
Act of the State of Utah is lacking in definiteness
as to an exact formula in fixing what is or what
is not below cost of a great many items of merchandise being bought and sold by merchants who
operate merchandise stores such as the Bush
Super Market; but that said indefiniteness is not
sufficient to hold the act wholly unconstitutional''
(Memo Decision). (Emphasis ours.)
In defining "cost to the retailer", the Act states
(Section 16-A-4-7, subdivisions 3 and 4, as amended in
1951):

""" "" "" The term 'cost to the retailer', shall
mean the invoice cost of the merchandise to the
retailer within thirty days prior to the date of sale,
or the date of offering for sale or the replacement
cost of the merchandise to the retailer, whichever
is lower * * *.

'' * * * The term 'replacement cost' shall mean
the cost per unit at which the merchandise sold or
offered for sale could have been bought by the
seller at any time within thirty days prior to the
date of sale or the date upon which it is offered
for sale by the seller if bought in the same quantity or quantities as the seller's last purchase of
the said merchandise.'' (Emphasis ours.)
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We call the attention of the Court to this provision
of the Act not only because it is an example of the indefiniteness of the statutory prohibitions but also because
it is a prohibition which lacks any rational relationship
to actual costs. Such a formula was held, in Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. 2d 67 (1940), to
render the Unfair Practices Act unconstitutional because
of vagueness and the arbitrary disregard of actual cost.
A very similar provision in the New Jersey Unfair Practices Act was held to be invalid in State v. Packard~Bam
berger & Co., 123 N. J. L. 180, 8 A. 2d 291 (1939); see
also, Great Atlwntic and Pacific Te.a Co. v. Ervin, 23 F.
Supp. 70 ( 1938).
The effect of this type of restriction is, first, that
the retail grocer never knows whether he is violating the
Act because he never knows what his "replacement cost"
is unless he maintains a constant and accurate check on
the market (State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308;
113 P. 2d 650 (1941); Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy & T. Co., 178 Md. 38; 12 A. 2d 201 (1940) ),
and, second, that he is prevented from making available
to the consuming public the benefit of his legitimate foresight or good fortune in buying at low prices commodities which remain on his hands for more than thirty
days. Thus in Florida Dry Cle,a.ning & Laundry Board
v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380 (1939)
the Court said :
''There is a distinct difference between delivery and the cash and carry aspect of the laundry
and dry cleaning business. The n1anner and cost
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of adn1inistration in each is materially different
and those who prefer to patronize the cash and
carry business are entitled to the advantage of this
difference.''
To the same effect in Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80
A. 2d 267 (Md. 1951)
"To say that Self-Service was selling below
cost because it did not charge itself with, but gave
its customers the benefit of, non-existent expenses
which it saved by selling for cash and making no
deliveries, would be as arbitrary and unfair as to
require one dealer to charge as much for short
tons as others charge for long tons'' (80A. 2d 267,
273).
While the statutes referred to in the foregoing cases
are not identical to the Utah Act in its definition of cost,
they each involved an attempt to impose a cost at variance with the actual cost and the courts invalidated them
for that reason. The Utah Act, we submit, is invalid for
the same reason.
In further defining ''cost to the retailer'', the Act
requires that the retailer add to his invoice (a) freight
charges, if incurred, and (b) cartage, if incurred, and
'' (c) a markup to cover a proportionate part of the cost
of doing business • • •.'' Here, again, is an element
of uncertainty, for there is no way whatever for the
merchant to compute that "proportionate part of the
cost of doing business" which he is to contribute either
to the various classes of his merchandise or to the in-
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dividual items; and, in fact, there is no way that such a
computation can be made (R. 192-193).
What ''part of the cost of doing business'' should
a retail grocer attribute to his canned vegetables as compared to his fresh vegetables~ And what '' proportionate part" should he attribute to canned beets, for
example, as compared to canned tuna fish~ How should
he allocate among the different items his rent, advertising expense, clerks' salaries, etc.? Should he allocate
costs differently when the merchandise is on the counter
instead of under the counter or on the shelves, or in the
refrigerator? Should he make a different allocation to
items that move slowly than to items which move
rapidly? These questions illustrate the impossibility of
making an apportionment as called for by the statute.
Mr. Bush did not attempt such a thing (R. 150-151).
Even to attempt such a thing would involve prohibitive
bookkeeping expense.
Finally, after defining "cost to the retailer" and
prohibiting the retailer from selling below "cost", the
statute goes on to provide (Sec. 16A-2-12(d)) that, "The
provisions of this act shall not apply to any sale made:
• • • {d) In an endeavor made in good faith to meet
the legal prices of a competitor as herein defined selling
the same article, product or commodity in the same
locality or trade area.'' Here, we think, is a provision
which makes the whole definition of ''cost'' completely
meaningless, for, in fact, there is no way in which a
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retailer can possibly ascertain ''the legal prices'' of a
competitor (R. 153). To do such a thing he would
have to be inforn1ed not only of the invoice or replacement cost within thirty days of the commodity being
sold by his competitor but he would also have to be
informed of the actual overhead of his competitor and
the method by which his competitor allocated hts overhead to the commodity in question. To this information,
the retailer has no access.
For the foregoing reasons, we submit that the only
way a retail merchant can be certain that he is not
violating our Unfair Practices Act is to close the doors
of his establishment and go out of business.
POINT V-THE RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION
WHICH IS THE REAL PARTY-PLAINTIFF IN
THIS ACTION, HAS BEEN GUILTY OF PRICE
FIXING IN VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT,
AND, ACCORDINGLY, COMES TO COUR'T WITH
UNCLEAN HANDS, AND FOR THAT REASON
SHOULD BE DENIED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,
FOR THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT DOES NOT,
AND COULD NOT, AUTHORIZE PRICE FIXING.

If, as we believe, the Retail Grocers' Association is
attempting here to fix prices in the retail grocery business in general and, in that regard, to discipline Mr.
Bush in particular, the Association is guilty of violating
the Sherman Act, and, consequently, comes to Court with
unclean hands. For that reason alone, it should be denied
the injunctive relief which it seeks. There is no doubt,
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of course, that we are dealing here with interstate commerce (R. 132).
As the United States Circuit Court pointed out in
Food and Orocery Bureau v. United States, 139 F. 2d
973 (C. C. A. 9th 1943), it is one thing to take joint action
to see that the members of a trade association do not
violate an unfair practices act by selling below cost with
the intent to injure competitors and destroy competition,
but it is quite another thing to take such action for the
purpose of :fixing prices without regard to intent, for, in
the :first place, the Act does not forbid sales below cost,
per se, but only sales below cost with a wrongful intent,
and, in the second place, such conduct on the part of a
trade association amounts to price fixing which clearly
violates the Sherman Act when applied to goods moving
in interstate commerce. As the Court said,
''The cases cited by the district judge in one of
his rulings sustain his holding that agreements
stabilizing such prices either at a maximum or a
minimum or through a formula violate the Sherman Act." (Citing many cases.) (p. 978.)
The activities of the Food and Grocery Bureau which
were held to amount to price :fixing are described in the
Opinion as follows :
''The Bureau served some thousands of
Southern California Retailers of food and groceries with frequent statements of minimum prices
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at which particular items of the trade should be
sold (p. 975).

• • • •
''The Bureau also was actively engaged in
investigating the prices of retailers, both members and others, and in putting pressure on them
not to sell below the cost of [or] price lists which
it circulated. In this, appellants claim, they were
doing no more than the policing of the California
Act.
''There is abundant evidence that for a period
from 1935 to 1941, the corporation [the Bureau]
and its president and two executive secretaries
conspired to compel the Bureau members and
others to sell food and groceries at not less than
minimum prices circulated by the Bureau regardless of whether such sales were with the intent to
injure a competitor or divert trade from him''
(p. 975).
Needless to say, the activities of the Utah Retail
Grocers Association precisely follow those of the California grocers' association, as outlined above, and for
the same reasons constituted price fixing. The closeness
of the parallel is accentuated by the fact that one of the
avowed purposes of the California association was ''to
bring to an end the disastrous price war now raging
here.'' In other words, it offered the same excuse for
its price fixing activities.
Notwithstanding his protestation that his Association did not attempt to fix any prices in any way and
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that it had no enforcement ability at all (R. 73}, it was
apparent that the witness Boyle, President of the Ogden
Retail Grocers Association, considered that it was part
of his duty as President of the Association, to "keep
the grocers in line on violations" (R. 82), and, particularly to police the price of 6% items (R. 90-91); and
there was not one word of testimony to indicate that the
question of intent was ever considered. The only difference between the present case and the Food and
Grocery Bureau case seems to be that, in the present
case the Association conducted its price fixing activities
with the active cooperation of our Trade Commission.
In practice, it appeared that the Association policed
prices on a cooperative basis and only went to the Trade
Commission when a merchant, like Mr. Bush, refused to
take his orders from the Association. In such a case, as
the present litigation illustrates, the Commission would
then issue a cease and desist order and, upon non-compliance, institute an enforcement proceeding. At that
point, the Association would actively intervene and its
counsel would, to all intents, conduct the prosecution.
If there was any difference in substance between the
activities of the Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern
California and the activities of the Utah Retail Grocers
Association, we fail to perceive it.
The only question left unanswered by the Food and
Grocery Bureau case was whether price fixing in interstate commerce could be sanctioned under state law. The
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United States Circuit Court, in the Food and Grocery
case, avoided that question by pointing out that the California Unfair Practices Act was not a price fixing act and,
therefore, no one could claim that it was intended to
sanction such a thing. In the case at bar, we think it
is not only plain that the Utah Act, like its California
prototype, was not intended to sanction price fixing
but we now have the benefit of Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers, 341 U. S. 384, 386, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95
L. Ed. 1035 (May 21, 1951), where the Supreme Court
noted that the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for individuals to enter into any agreement, express or implied,
limiting or :fixing prices, such price fixing being unlawful
per se; and then commented that,
''The fact that a state authorizes the price
fixing does not, of course, give immunity to the
scheme absent approval by Congress.''
Accordingly, we respectfully submit that injunctive
relief should have been denied in the case at bar because
the plaintiffs, being in violation of the Sherman Act,
came to court with unclean hands. The Unfair Practices
Act not only did not and could not authorize price fixing,
but was never intended to do so.

CONCLUSION
Defendant made no sales below "cost", as defined
by the Act.
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Defendant's allowance of cash discounts, through
the use of cash discount stamps, did not have the effect
of reducing prices.
Defendant made no sales ''for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition.''
If the Act is construed to prohibit the issuance of
cash discount stamps with 6% merchandise, it is unconstitutional; and so it is, in any event, because it violates
the due process and equal protection clauses of our State
and Federal constitutions.
Plaintiffs in intervention come to Court with unclean
hands.
April 5, 1952.
Respectfully submitted,
ATHOL RAWLINS,

c.

E.

HENDERSON,

of RAY, RAwLINs, JoNES & HENDERSON,
.Attorneys for Defendant-.A.ppella!nt.

R. R. BuLLIVANT,

of the Oregon Bar,
of Counsel.
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